Athalya Brenner's brief essay, as one would expect, is a fascinating, if necessarily preliminary, exploration of the treatment of sons and daughters in the Torah and Proverbs, and as such raises as many questions as it answers; I hope that I can contribute to its further development. I am a great admirer of Brenner, and am currently reading her book of autobiographical essays of biblical women, I Am, with much pleasure. One can say so much more, and with more subtlety, in fiction than in conventional academic exposition. Perhaps that is the point of this essay too, with its emphasis on the fictiveness of the Torah's laws, on the uncertainty of their relationship to praxis, whatever that is.
I must confess also a certain disappointment, precisely on the issue of the imagination. Neither the Torah nor Proverbs lack complexity; both require very close reading. I was expecting, in this essay, both more detailed attention to the text and a greater sense of ideological conflict. But I also wondered: Why Torah and Proverbs?
Why these two texts, in a synchronous reading, and not the others in between? Why no context? And why the selection, for instance, of the Torah's laws without its narratives, of Proverbs' sandwich without its filling? I will begin with Brenner's first sentence, which is in some respects the crucial one. "This essay traces, in general lines, how the regulations a society presents as normative may reveal its deepest uncertainties." Indeed this may be or must be so; but surely there is spectrum of uncertainty. Some areas of life may arouse very great anxiety e.g. sexual practices, while others might be regarded as rather trivial, such as parking regulations. Careful analysis is required to assess the emotive value of each case. Then we go on to Brenner's next phrase: "more so than its implied praxis." But what praxis is implied by a regulation? Surely the regulation itself! Or shall we say that a regulation implies no praxis whatsoever? It is a simply a regulation. To infer a praxis, and certainly a praxis differing from a regulation, one needs historical evidence. The evidence is occasionally there, at least in texts, but the crucial point is that its source must be different from the regulation. Brenner's may indeed be a "vertical (chronologically, textually intersecting) as well as horizontal enquiry," but I am not sure that she has done this. Where is the vertical dimension here? I do not find a chronology, stratification, or the textual analysis that would produce such a thing. I am not sure, moreover, how this can be reconciled with Brenner's subsequent statement that "my approach in this survey is social/cultural and literary/critical rather than historical".
Let us turn to Brenner's "general guidelines and premises," from which this quotation is taken. There are four:
1. The relation between text and "reality" is uncertain.
2. Texts produce other texts, with an equally uncertain relationship to reality. 4. The Ancient Near Eastern context will be ignored.
I will focus on two issues:
1. "For us, the Bible is a parallel universe not only to ours, but to the [social, moral] worlds we tease out of it". In fact, there are four worlds: the world of the Bible, that of the reality it addresses and in which it is written, the world(s) the interpreter "teases out of it", and our world. None of these worlds is parallel to the others. It is the difference between them that is important. Indeed, Brenner's earlier metaphor of "textually intersecting" is appropriate. The Bible is necessarily an apperception, as is our own interpretation of it. We don't simply, naively, project our own world on to the text, just as we don't equally simply leave it behind.
2. The "prescriptions and prohibitions" may be anchored in "modes of production, subsistence and culture," but, as Roland Boer has argued in an excellent essay on Deutero-Isaiah, 1 the substructures of premodern societies are theological and symbolic. In other words, a proper materialist analysis of a society's economy has to take into account its entire system of values, its total symbolic capital. I would note, also, that a materialist interpretation has to be historically grounded. The opposition Brenner interposes between social/cultural readings and historical ones does not exist (I am not sure where literary criticism fits into this). I suspect that by the "social/cultural" approach Brenner in fact refers to what historians of the Braudel school used to call the "long durée," abiding trends and conditions rather than short term events. Nonetheless, even the long durée has to be historically located e.g. in the late monarchic or Persian periods, with their long term or cataclysmic changes. Now such locations are notoriously difficult to determine, whence the need, from
Brenner's point of view, to reconstruct the social world implied by the text. But then we run aground on the problem, mentioned above, that the worlds of the text and reality are not congruent. This is especially the case with the Torah, which projects a variety of utopias and dystopias that are the product of the human imagination whose relation to reality is always a matter of negotiation. From a materialist point of view, texts are the work of people, and people's thoughts, emotions, pleasures and fears are never fully determined, at least by the cultural background.
As a result of the preference for interpretations based on "modes of production"
etc. an economic reductionism pervades the essay. There are two clear examples. One is the unsubstantiated assertion that the injunction to "Honour your father and mother" is "undoubtedly an economic necessity". This ignores the primacy of honour as social currency in Mediterranean society, and in particular "the honour of the family."
Honouring father and mother, with its attendant rituals of deference, is a prerequisite for the family's enactment of its status and the perpetuation of the patriarchal principle. It is relatively independent of economic circumstances; a family may be poor but honourable, or conversely, rich but discredited. Secondly, Brenner suggests that "'be fruitful and multiply' is a highly realistic ideology in times and places of alarming child mortality". I can't see, however, that in the creation narrative in which it appears it has anything to do with child mortality or even anxiety, especially when it applies to the animals. Its message is that the reproductive drive is mandated by God, as part of the general insistence of the creation narrative that there is no such thing as nature separate from God's will. 
10). In these cases it is
transgressive paternal sexuality that is regulated, and hence the source of anxiety.
In short, one has to look at the general verbal context and theme. If "sons and daughters" appear as part of a long list, clearly the regulation does not specifically concern them. It is not that D is more "generous" than the other Torah texts, but it has different rhetorical goals. Deuteronomy is interested in evoking communal solidarity, an ideally blissful Israel; other texts (including Deuteronomy at times!) in defining the sacred. Some texts, moreover, are slippery and ambiguous, like life. What is one to make of the father who sells his daughter, and the Torah's attempt to protect her rights? Does the injunction to educate one's "sons"/"children" (Deut.6.7, 11.19) or to narrate the Exodus (Exod.12.25-28, 13.14-15, Deut.6.20-24), apply also to daughters?
To sum up, daughters are mentioned along with sons when it serves the text's rhetorical agenda, sons exclusively when it wishes to delimit the sacred. Brenner is right, however, about the anxiety concerning sexuality. It is not directed, however, exclusively or primarily against female sexuality. In Proverbs, for instance, it is the young man who is being warned against his own desires. In the incest code in Leviticus, the legislation is directed against infractions by both sexes.
A few concluding observations. Brenner's list of objectionable sacrifices (Abraham and Isaac, Jephthah's daughter, the Crucifixion) consists of one that does not take place, a second that exemplifies the motif of the "stupid vow" and hardly meets with the narrator's approval, and a third from outside the Hebrew Bible. The texts selfevidently emanate from an urban elite in an agrarian world; there is little that can be deduced about that world that cannot be explicated by the ideological and rhetorical goals of the text (to imagine an ideal Israel on the one hand, to train youth on the other).
